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Muslim active citizenship in Australia: Socioeconomic challenges and the 
emergence of a Muslim elite  
 
Abstract 
The recent national Census demonstrated that Australian Muslims continue to occupy a 
socioeconomically disadvantaged position. On key indicators of unemployment rate, 
income, type of occupation and home ownership, Muslims consistently under-perform 
the national average. This pattern is evident in the last three Census data (2001, 2006 
and 2011). Limited access to resources and a sense of marginalisation present 
challenges to full engagement with society and the natural growth of emotional 
affiliation with Australia. Muslim active citizenship is hampered by socioeconomic 
barriers. At the same time, an increasingly proactive class of educated Muslim elite has 
emerged to claim a voice for Muslims in Australia and promote citizenship rights and 
responsibilities.     
Keywords: Muslims, active citizenship, socioeconomic marginalisation, civic elite, 
multiculturalism 
 
 
Introduction  
Australia is a diverse multicultural society that is committed to equal opportunities for all 
citizens of different ethnic backgrounds (Tavan 2012). Following the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, Bali bombing of 2002 and London bombings of 2005, however, Muslim 
citizens have come under extreme scrutiny. The tabloid media and populist political leaders 
have implied a link between Islam and terrorism and cast doubt over the future of Muslims in 
Australia. Critics of multiculturalism have seized the opportunity to argue against ethnic and 
religious diversity for its purported generation of ghettos that pose a threat to ‘Australian 
values’ (Johnson 2007). For Australian Muslims this turn of events has been extremely 
hurtful. The demonisation of Muslims as potential terrorists, and the repeated pressure on 
Muslims to denounce terrorism, has caused angst and alienation. In response, a number of 
community initiatives and organisations have emerged to bridge the gap. That has meant 
working on two distinct levels. On one level, they engage with the media, government 
agencies and policy-makers to voice community concerns and dispel doubts about Muslims 
loyalty as law abiding citizens. On the other level, they work within their own grass-root 
communities to enhance capacity by providing training, advice and guidance. The emergence 
of an articulate Muslim elite has made a difference in the public domain and helped challenge 
some of the most outrageous presumptions about Australian Muslims.  
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This article draws upon census data over the post-2001 decade and interviews with a variety 
of key community figures, to present an analysis on key areas of civic and political 
participation by Australian Muslims. It offers fresh insight into their socioeconomic trajectory 
over the decade 2001-2011 and utilises the data to reflect on the current status of Australian 
Muslim citizenship. Muslims continue to occupy a significantly disadvantaged position. 
Although it must be noted that over the past decade some Muslims have accumulated 
socioeconomic capital and resources, allowing them to be civically and politically engaged 
citizens, this has not changed the persistent picture of socioeconomic disparity. Moreover, the 
data analysis points to a growing schism within the Muslim community. A substantial 
proportion of Muslims have failed to climb the socioeconomic mobility ladder and have 
remained – or have become even more – socially marginalised and disenfranchised. These 
contradictory developments have implications for Australian Muslims’ active engagement.  
This article posits that a small but growing civic Muslim elite has emerged, who have learned 
to play the game of political and civic lobbying to advance the civic standing of Muslim 
communities and to contribute to build a more cohesive society at large. On the other hand, 
the continued socioeconomic marginalisation of many Australian Muslims poses significant 
challenges for their integration and belonging.  
Methodology 
This article is based on a detailed analysis of statistical data from recent Australian census 
rounds, especially from the 2011 and 2006 Census. This analysis covers the post 9/11 decade 
and offers highly insightful views on key development of Islam in Australia during this 
crucial period.  
This article examines the demographic, educational and socioeconomic status of Muslims in 
2011 and recent developments through the lens of active citizenship. To allow a deeper 
examination of the census statistics, the authors additionally draw upon qualitative data 
obtained through 15 in-depth interviews, conducted in 2012 and 2013 in Melbourne and 
Sydney, with Muslim community figures and other ‘ordinary’ Muslim citizens, who have 
been actively involved in various forms of grassroots community, cross-community and 
mainstream engagement. These interviews have been carried out within the scope of two 
separate research projects: first, an Australian Research Council (ARC) founded study on 
active Muslim citizenship in Australia and the UK (2011-2013) and, second, an ongoing PhD 
research project on civic and political participation of Muslims in Australia and Germany 
(2012-2015). Some evidence was also drawn from an ARC funded study examining legal 
pluralism based upon semi-structured face-to-face interviews in Sydney. These qualitative 
data add depth to the analysis of the census and facilitate the interpretation of the statistics 
with regard to Muslims’ active citizenship. This quantitative-qualitative methodological mix 
has proven well suited to reveal new insights into how Australian Muslims experience the 
positive possibilities and constraints of Australian citizenship. 
Theoretical framework: active citizenship and resources  
Active, participatory forms of democratic citizenship require a certain level of social 
resources and dispositions. As Jan W. van Deth  has aptly pointed out: ‘Democracy doesn’t 
deserve its name without citizens’ participation…Citizens’ involvement, however, cannot be 
taken for granted but depends heavily on resources, motivation, and social contacts’ (2013: 
9). This understanding of citizenship stands in contrast to other more static models that argue 
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‘citizenship is most adequately defined in terms of both rights and duties’ and as a ‘social 
status that confers membership of a political community that in turn determines an 
individual's share’ (Turner 2013: 231). According to the latter rights-and-duty based 
understanding of citizenship, the ‘status of citizen is not derogated or jeopardized if they 
choose not to be so active’ (Isin and Wood 1999: 7).  
Isin and Turner posit in the introduction to their edited Handbook of Citizenship Studies that 
the notion of citizenship as a ‘status held under the authority of a state’ has been expanded to 
‘include various political and social struggles of recognition and redistribution as instances of 
claim-making, and hence, by extension, of citizenship’ (2002: 2). This paradigm shift has 
contributed to generating an array of new analytical tools and approaches to examine social 
phenomena of active participation as a fundamental pillar of citizenship. This broader 
understanding of citizenship also addresses less formalised forms of civic and political claim-
makings, collective mobilisation and group consciousness, the role of agency and ‘equal 
standing in civil society’ (Conover et al 2004: 1037). In this context the notion of active 
citizenship has gained prominence.  
Active citizenship emphasises varied dimensions of civic-political engagement and can be 
conceptualised in different ways depending on specific traditions. Republican citizenship, for 
example, deploys an individualistic notion of the ‘good citizen’ who participates in the public 
sphere working towards the greater good of society, even though this may not always 
coincide with their own personal interests (Dagger 2002). The communitarian tradition 
challenges the republican ideal of a clearly-defined common good. ‘For communitarians, 
citizenship is about participation in the political community but it is also about the 
preservation of identity, and therefore citizenship is always specific to a particular 
community’ (Delanty 2002: 163). This communitarian logic emphasises that active 
engagement is often driven by the specific agenda of a particular community group, which 
highlights the relevance of this communitarian version of active citizenship for the collective 
claim-making of minorities and their communities. More pluralistic models of citizenship, as 
proposed by scholars such as Young (1989), Mouffe (1995) and Kymlicka (1995), stress the 
active component of minorities’ mobilisation for substantive equality and more particularistic 
goals like accommodation and recognition of their community. Chantal Mouffe calls in her 
model of radical democracy for a less rigid notion of citizens’ context-specific identities as 
the constantly shifting foundations of their active engagement within social movements and 
other forms of mobilisation. These multiple identifications need to be constantly negotiated in 
a way ‘to make our belonging to different communities of values, language, culture and 
others compatible with our common belonging to a political community’ (Mouffe 1995: 34).  
All these political and philosophical concepts of active citizenship are of relevance when 
examining Muslim civic and political engagement in Australia. Muslims may act as public-
spirited (‘republican’) citizens seeking to serve the whole society and pursuing the common 
good, but they may also engage in public affairs more specifically in order to advance the 
wellbeing and recognition of their own religious community and redress exclusionary 
stigmatisations. These divergent aims can be pursued through classical means of formal 
political participation (e.g. electoral participation) and civic engagement (e.g. voluntary 
community work), as well as in less formalised and more unconventional manners (e.g. 
blogging).  Furthermore, in accordance with Mouffe’s notion of fluid identities, Muslims may 
engage in collective mobilisation activities outside narrowly defined community boundaries, 
be it as feminist or human rights activists or in the trade unions, to name but a few. This may 
be acted out within traditional community organisational structures, but it can also emerge in 
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more ‘fluid and unstructured forms of participation’ (Fahmy 2006: 105), which has become 
particularly prevalent among young people (Vromen 2003) and has been described as ‘DIY 
citizenship’ (Harris and Roose 2013).  
It may be argued that access to resources facilitates active citizenship. People with high levels 
of education and a higher socioeconomic status are more likely to become active in the 
formal and informal political space or civic forms of engagement. This fundamental premise 
can be considered empirically well-established, although there might be an ongoing dispute 
on the true nature and causality of this relationship between higher education and 
socioeconomic status and civic and political participation (see, for example, Berinsky and 
Lenz 2011; Cohen et al. 2001). 
A commonly used framework to explain civic and political participation is the Civic 
Voluntarism Model, developed by Sidney Verba, Kay L. Schlozman and Henry E. Brady 
within their large US-study Voices and Equality (1995). This model identifies three key 
determinants of political participation: individual resources, psychological predispositions 
(‘political engagement’) and political recruitment (Verba et al. 1995: 269-73).  Verba and his 
colleagues stress, however, the crucial importance of individual resources:  
All three components of the model are important. However, we place greater 
emphasis on the resources that facilitate participation and on the variety of 
psychological predispositions towards politics that we label “political 
engagement” than on political recruitment…With respect to resources and 
engagement, …we place greater stress on the former (Verba et al. 1995: 270). 
According to Verba et al. (1995), the individual resources that affect one’s capacity and 
proneness to become politically active encompass three separate dimensions: time, money 
and civic skills, the latter being described as a person’s ‘organizational and communications 
capacity’ (271) People gain and enhance their civic skills in the family, during their formal 
education, at the workplace and through their participation in civil society organisations (304-
33). Those who know how to communicate effectively and to organise the political 
involvement, are not only more likely to become politically engaged, but their participation 
also tends to be more efficient – which again encourages further political commitment: ‘being 
more active may increase engagement as participants become more interested, informed, and 
efficacious’ (344).   
In addition to this, according to Verba and his colleagues, most decisive explanatory factor of 
political participation, citizens’ personal interests in politics and a basic motivation to become 
politically active are considered crucial. Verba et al. refer to this as ‘political engagement’ 
(1995: 344). ‘[I]t is hard to image that at least some psychological engagement with politics 
is not required for almost all forms of political participation’ (345). Verba et al.’s empirical 
analysis clearly indicates that ‘resources and political engagement jointly matter for political 
participation’ (351), the former giving citizens the ability to act and the latter providing the 
motivation. As a third and least important determinant of political participation, the US 
research team identified citizens’ personal involvement in (non-political) institutions of adult 
life – ‘the workplace, voluntary association, or church’ (369). 
This explanatory model with its emphasis on individual resources as key facilitator of 
participation bears similarities with other resource-based frameworks and research findings 
5 
 
which also highlight that political participation is more prevalent among those with a higher 
socioeconomic status (e.g., Peterson 1990) and educational attainments. Rosenstone and 
Hansen posit that education ‘imparts the knowledge and skills most essential to a citizen’s 
task’ (1993: 136) and makes well-educated citizens more capable (and likely) to actively 
engage in one or another form of political participation. Essentially the same pattern applies 
to civic participation, more precisely, their engagement in voluntary work, as various 
research and statistics have consistently shown. The special analysis of the 2010 General 
Social Survey (GSS) data, for example, found significantly higher volunteering rates among 
adult Australians who are studying or employed (as opposed to those unemployed), those 
with higher school attainments and a higher weekly household income. Moreover, the 
proficiency in English (measured as language spoke at home) also affects the likelihood of 
volunteering (ABS 2010: 10 and 14). 
The above conceptual framework is very relevant to better understanding the level and 
nuances of Muslim engagement in Australia. The following analysis of statistical data 
explores some key measurable socioeconomic barriers to full Muslim citizenship. This 
quantitative analysis relies on data from the 2011 Census, with reference to 2001 and 2006 
Census data where appropriate to highlight important trends and persistent patterns..   
Australian Muslims in the census: demographics and resources   
General demographics 
According to the latest Census in 2011, more than 476,000 people in Australia identify as 
Muslims. Australian Muslim population has grown continuously since the mid-20th century. 
In 2006, around 340,000 Australians self-declared as Muslim. Today 2.2 per cent of the total 
population of Australia are Muslims, which makes Islam the second largest minority religion 
in Australia after Buddhism (Table 1).1    
Table 1: Number of self-identified Muslims (2001, 2006, 2011) 
Year Number of Muslims Proportion of total 
population 
Changes (number 
and percentage)  
2001 281,576 1.5% 1996-2001: + 40.2% 
2006 340,393 1.7% 2001-2006: + 20.9% 
2011 476,292 2.2% 2006-2011: + 39.9% 
Source: ABS 2001; ABS 2006; ABS 2011 
In 2011, 37.6 per cent of Muslims were born in Australia; this proportion has not changed 
much over the past decade (2001: 36.4 per cent; 2006: 37.9 per cent). Muslims born overseas 
come from a range of countries, with Lebanon, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkey as the top 
ranking countries of birth. In the past decade the number (and proportion) of Muslims born in 
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and India has increased. In contrast Muslim migration 
from Turkey and Bosnia-Herzegovina has significantly declined (Table 2).  
  
                                                          
1
 The Buddhist share of the Australian population is 2.5 per cent. 
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Table 2: Top ten countries of birth: Muslims (2001, 2006, 2011), in percentage 
2001 2006 2011 
Australia 36.4 Australia 37.9 Australia 37.6 
Lebanon 10.4 Lebanon 8.9 Lebanon 7.1 
Turkey 8.3 Turkey 6.8 Pakistan 5.6 
Afghanistan 3.5 Afghanistan 4.7 Afghanistan 5.5 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
3.5 Pakistan 4.1 Turkey 5.3 
Pakistan 3.3 Bangladesh 3.9 Bangladesh  5.0 
Indonesia  2.9 Iraq 2.9 Iraq 3.3 
Iraq  2.8 Indonesia 2.5 Iran 2.7 
Bangladesh  2.7 Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
2.2 Indonesia 2.6 
Iran  2.3 Iran 2.1 India 2.1 
Other  23.9 Other  24.0 Other  23.2 
Source: ABS 2001; ABS 2006; ABS 2011 
Muslims in Australia have been characterised by their young demographic profile. Census 
figures in 2001, 2006 and 2011 show that Muslims are consistently overrepresented in lower 
age brackets (up to around 40 years) and underrepresented in the older age groups. The 
differences continue to be particularly pronounced within the age bracket of those under 5 
years and those older than 65. A longitudinal comparison does not suggest major changes, 
although the proportion of Muslims younger than 15 (in relation to all Muslims) has slowly 
decreased from 30.8 per cent (2001) to 29.2 per cent (2011), while the proportion of Muslims 
older than 65 has increased from 2.8 per cent (2001) to 3.4 per cent (2011) (Table 3). 
Table 3: Age profile: Muslims and total population (2001, 2006, 2011), in percentage 
 2001 2006 2011 
Muslims Total population Muslims 
Total 
population Muslims 
Total 
population 
0 – 4 10.6 6.6 10.8 6.3 11.4 6.6 
5 – 14 20.2 14.1 19.1 13.5 17.8 12.7 
15 – 24 18.7 13.5 18.8 13.6 17.3 13.3 
25 – 34 18.2 14.4 18.7 13.5 20.8 13.8 
35 – 44 15.3 15.1 14.8 14.8 14.5 14.2 
45 – 54 9.5 13.5 9.5 13.9 9.6 13.7 
55 – 64 4.8 9.3 5.2 11.0 5.3 11.6 
65+ 2.8 12.5 3.0 13.3 3.4 14.0 
All 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: ABS 2001; ABS 2006; ABS 2011 
This demographic outlook of Australian Muslims has implications for the scope, and possibly 
also on the nature, of their civic and political participation. The much younger age profile of 
Muslims may partially explain their lower civic and political participation rate. Children and 
teenagers are less likely to engage with society in such ways. The GSS special analysis found 
that volunteering is most popular with people in the age bracket of 35 to 64 (ABS 2010, p. 
10), within which Muslims are underrepresented. According to the GSS analysis, people born 
in Australia are more likely to volunteer than overseas born immigrants (ABS 2011, p. 10).  
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Political rights and citizenship 
In 2011, three quarters of all residents who identify as Muslims hold Australian citizenship 
(74.1 per cent) (ABS 2011). This proportion includes the 38 per cent of Muslims born in 
Australia as well as naturalised overseas-born immigrants. A special analysis, based on 2006 
census data and other statistics of the Department of Immigration and Citizenship, 
demonstrates that naturalisation rates are particularly high among immigrants from many of 
those countries where Muslims predominantly come from (Smith et al. 2011). Taking into 
account criteria of eligibility (e.g. duration of residence), Smith and colleagues calculate a 
naturalisation rate of 96 per cent among immigrants born in Lebanon, 93 per cent for those 
from Turkey and 87 per cent for Iraqi-born migrants. These figures are well above the overall 
average of 80 per cent of all foreign-born residents.  
Legal citizenship status grants individuals full civic, social and political rights and 
responsibilities, including the right and duty to vote and the entitlement to run for public 
office. Muslims remain, however, severely underrepresented in the political decision-making 
processes. As of late 2013, only two members of the Commonwealth parliament, self-identify 
as Muslim. Ed Husic was elected in 2010 and was sworn into office (on the Quran) as 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister and Broadband in the previous Labor 
government in 2013. In November 2013, Mehmet Tillam, a Turkish-born Australian was also 
sworn into Parliament on the Quran, though only to fill a short-term senate vacancy. Tayfun 
Eren, the first Muslim in an Australian parliament, was elected to the Victorian state 
parliament in 1996 and held his seat until 1999. In 2002, Turkish-born politician Adem 
Somyurek won a seat in the Victorian parliament, which he continues to hold. He was joined 
by John Eren in 2006 and Khalil Eideh in 2007. In New South Wales, the first Muslim 
member of the NSW parliament, Shaoquett Moselmane (Labor), was elected only in 2009. In 
June 2013, the Pakistani-born Mehreen Faruqi (Greens), an environmental engineer, was 
appointed by her party to the NSW Senate. Faruqi has often been referred to as the first 
Muslim women in an Australian parliament. 
Education 
Census data from the past decade (2001-2011) reveal that many Muslims have reached in 
some ways similar or higher educational attainments compared to the population as a whole. 
A significantly higher proportion of Muslims have obtained a Bachelor, graduate or 
postgraduate degree. Moreover, in 2006 and 2011 Muslims have been underrepresented 
among those who have left high school in Year 11 or earlier. Muslims have also been 
underrepresented, however, in the certificate level category, which refers to a basic post-
secondary degree obtained outside the university sector. Despite their strong representation 
among those with a university degree, Muslims are still more likely to have no post-
secondary education at all; this applies to 52.92 per cent of Muslims compared to 46.05 per 
cent among the total population. The educational advantage of Muslims (as defined by 
possession of university degrees) grew between 2006 and 2011. In 2011, for example, 8.42 
per cent of Muslims held graduate/post-graduate degrees, which constitutes an increase by 
42.7 per cent compared to the 2006 figure (5.9 per cent); among the total population, the 
proportion of those with graduate/post-graduate degrees increased from 4.03 to 5.34 per cent, 
which constitutes a less significant increase of 32.5 per cent. This growth points to the 
emergence of a well-educated group within Muslim communities, that stands out with 
significant levels of civic skills (Verba et al. 1995) and social capital. 
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Graph 1: Highest education attainments: Muslims and total population (2006, 2011), in 
percentage    
 
Source: ABS 2006; ABS 2011 
These data suggest a growing educational divide within Muslim communities as some 
Muslims do exceptionally well while many others lag behind. Furthermore, there is an 
emerging gap between Australian-born and overseas-born Muslims. Graph 2 on the highest 
tertiary (non-school) education qualification shows that overseas-born Muslims are much 
more likely to have a postgraduate or Bachelor degree than Australian-born Muslims, as well 
as the total Australian population. However, educational capital may not translate directly 
into enhanced social and economic capital for overseas-born Australian Muslims, due to a 
range of factors among them non-recognition of overseas qualification (Colic-Peisker and 
Tilbury 2006). 
Graph 2: Post-Year 12 (non-school) qualifications: all Muslims, total population and 
Australian-born Muslims (2011), in percentage 
 
Source: ABS 2011; missing to 100%: not (adequately) stated; only applicable cases 
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Language 
Being able to speak the language of the country of residence is crucial for many forms of 
civic engagement, in particular for those that require inter-community interaction with 
mainstream stakeholders in the political arena or civil society. The vast majority of Muslims 
in Australia consider their English proficiency to be very or fairly high. According to the 
2011 census data, 82 per cent of Muslims speak either only English (13.0 per cent) or they 
speak English as a second language very well (46.5 per cent) or well (22.9 per cent). Around 
16 per cent of all Muslims in Australia have only poor (‘speak not well’, 11.4 per cent) or no 
English language skills at all (4.2 per cent). Not surprisingly, recent immigrants are 
overrepresented in this low English proficiency group, while around 86 per cent of 
Australian-born Muslims have no difficulties communicating in English (ABS 2011). It must 
be noted, however, that more than one in ten Muslims born in Australia do not speak English 
well (5.6 per cent) or don’t speak it at all (5.3 per cent). 
Labour market participation    
Muslims on average continue to occupy a disadvantaged position in the labour market. In 
2011, the nationwide unemployment rate among Muslims was at 12.6 per cent, which is more 
than twice as high as the national average of 5.6 per cent (ABS 2011).2 Table 4 documents 
this disparity and shows that the fall in the unemployment rate among Muslims is higher than 
the general population. The rate of Muslim recovery from unemployment between 2001 and 
2011 was 33.8 per cent while the general population experienced a slower recovery rate of 
23.9 per cent in the same period. The drop in the Muslim unemployment rate has even 
continued between 2006 and 2011, while the general unemployment rate actually increased 
slightly. 
Table 4: Unemployment rates: Muslims and total population (2001, 2006, 2011), in 
percentage 
 
Muslims Total population 
2001 19.08 7.4 
2006 13.42 5.24 
2011 12.63 5.63 
Source: ABS 2001; ABS 2006; ABS 2011  
The statistical analysis suggests that Muslims’ high unemployment rates are not 
predominantly attributed to recent immigration and subsequent adjustment processes during 
early stages of settlement. In 2011, Australian-born Muslims are almost as likely to be 
unemployed (11.8 per cent) as Australian Muslims in general. Not surprisingly, the 
unemployment rate among those Muslims with low English language skills is very high: 
24.46 per cent of Muslims who do not speak English well and 36.83 per cent of those without 
any English skills are unemployed (ABS 2011).  
Australian Muslims continue to work often in low-skilled occupations and have jobs typically 
characterised by physically hard labour, unfavourable working hours and/or low wages. 
Muslims are overrepresented among machinery operators, drivers and labourers and 
                                                          
2
 Defined as the proportion of those aged over 15 years without a job who are actively looking for work in 
relation to the total labour force. 
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underrepresented in managerial positions and among professionals. A comparison between 
all Muslims and those born in Australia reveals a somewhat ambiguous picture. Australian-
born Muslims, for example, work more often as technicians or qualified trades workers, as 
clerical, admin or sales workers – and less often as machinery operators and labourers – than 
Muslims in general. This indicates a move away from low-skilled and less prestigious 
occupations among second generation Muslims. Importantly, foreign-born Muslims are more 
likely to work in professional occupations than their Australian-born counterparts, perhaps 
due to strict rules on skilled migration as a prerequisite to settlement. A longitudinal analysis 
comparing all Muslims to the total Australian population shows consistent progress as 
Muslims have been catching up to the national average. This applies across the occupational 
spectrum, but is particularly evident in the occupational area of professionals (Table 5).   
Table 5: Occupational status (15+ years): all Muslims, total population (2006, 2011) and 
Australian-born Muslims (2011), in percentage  
  
2006 2011 
(changes 2006-2011: percentage points) 
Muslims Total population all Muslims 
Total 
population 
Australian-
born 
Muslims 
Managers 9.11 13.21 9.24 (+0.13) 12.86 (-0.35) 9.57 
Professionals 17.04 19.84 20.27 (+3.23) 21.33 (+1.49) 16.22 
Technicians and 
Trades Workers 14.86 14.38 14.54 (-0.32) 14.17 (-0.21) 16.20 
Community/Pers
onal Service 
Workers 
7.93 8.81 9.53 (+1.60) 9.66 (+0.85) 8.35 
Clerical/Admin 
Workers 10.85 15.00 11.37 (+0.52) 14.75 (-0.25) 16.06 
Sales Workers 10.75 9.84 9.82 (-0.93) 9.37 (-0.47) 14.48 
Machinery 
Operators and 
Drivers 
11.25 6.64 9.92 (-1.33) 6.56 (-0.08) 6.73 
Labourers 14.48 10.46 12.08 (-2.40) 9.42 (-1.04) 8.73 
Source: ABS 2006; ABS 2011 
Missing to 100%: not stated or inadequately described 
 
Income 
The disadvantaged labour market position of Muslims translates into lower personal and 
household income. With regard to the personal annual income of every person aged 15 and 
over, Muslims are clearly overrepresented in the lower income brackets of less than 
AU$16,000 (Graph 3). Australian-born Muslims are not doing any better in terms of their 
financial situation than Muslims in general. Rather the opposite is the case: While Muslims 
born in Australia and those born overseas do not differ significantly in the medium and 
higher income groups, Australian-born Muslims are more likely to have no or very low 
annual income. 33.6 per cent of Muslims born in Australia have an annual income of less 
than AU$10,400 (includes negative and no income) compared to 27.7 per cent among all 
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Muslims and 15.6 per cent among the total population (Graph 3). These income disparities 
between Australian-born Muslims  and those born overseas may partially be attributed to the 
fact that Muslims born in Australia are particularly overrepresented in the age bracket of 15 
to 19, which is relevant for the statistics on personal income.  
Graph 3: Weekly and annual personal income: all Muslims, Australian-born Muslims, 
total population (2011), in percentage 
 
Source: ABS 2011, refers to people aged 15+ 
Muslim households also tend to have much less financial means at their disposal than the 
national average. The Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS) defines poverty as 50 
per cent of the median (middle) disposable income for all Australian households (in 2010: 
$752 per week for a couple with two children) (2012: 6-7). The benchmark for poverty 
according to ACOSS is $358 per week for a single adult. 
Muslims are significantly more likely to live in poverty than non-Muslim Australians. One in 
ten Muslim households have less than AU$200 a week, while this applies only to 3.7 per cent 
of all Australian households. A further 23.7 per cent of Muslim household have a weekly 
income of between AU$200 and AU$400, compared to 16.5 per cent among all households. 
Accordingly, Muslim households are underrepresented in the income bracket of AU$600 and 
more per week. The higher the income level, the wider the gap between Muslim and other 
households grows (Graph 4). 
Although an accurate comparison with the 2006 census data is not feasible due to changed 
income categories and a different definition of Muslim household, the figures suggest that the 
financial situation of Muslim households has not improved, and possibly even further 
aggravated over the previous half decade. In 2006, for example, 9.28 per cent of Muslim 
households (‘at least one resident is Muslim’) had a weekly income of less AU$250 (all 
households: 7.54 per cent). In 2011, 20.7 per cent of Muslim households (‘reference person is 
Muslim’) had AU$299 or less, compared to 8.36 per cent of all households. 
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Graph 4: Equivalised weekly household income of Muslims and total population (2011), 
in percentage 
 
Source: ABS 2011  
Note: Missing to 100% partially or not stated income; Muslim household defined as 
‘reference person is Muslim’ 
Tenure 
According to Riaz Hassan, home ownership is ‘the most common vehicle through which 
Australians accumulate private wealth’ (2010: 579). Owning one’s home without having to 
pay a mortgage increases the cash flow in the household and contributes to a sense of 
financial and emotional stability and permanency. In 2011, only 44 per cent of Muslim 
households resided in a house or apartment that they owned (13 per cent outright and 31 per 
cent with a mortgage), compared to 67 per cent of all Australian households (32 per cent 
owned outright and 35 per cent with a mortgage). Half of all Muslim households rented in 
2011, while this applied only to 29 per cent of all households (Graph 5). 
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Graph 5: Housing tenure: Muslim and all households (2006, 2011), in percentage 
  
Source: ABS 2006; ABS 2011  
Note: Muslim household in 2006 defined as ‘at least one resident is Muslim’ and in 2011 as 
‘reference person is Muslim’. 
The changes that have occurred since 2006 may be minor but point to a negative 
development. In 2011, more Muslim household lived in rented properties. Muslims’ home 
ownership rates (with and without a mortgage) are lower than in 2006. The analysis also 
suggests increased disparities with regard to tenure between Muslims and the total population 
(Graph 5). This may be in parts attributed to the ongoing immigration of first generation 
Muslims, who are still in an early stage of their settlement process in Australia, but also 
reflects the disadvantaged financial situation of Muslims in an increasingly unaffordable 
property market in many metropolitan areas. Moreover, as an emerging body of evidence 
suggests, at least some observant Muslims face difficulties in purchasing a home due to their 
reluctance to pay home loans linked to interest. Riba (Interest) is considered impermissible 
within Islam. 
 An emerging elite and a growing socioeconomic schism within the Muslim communities 
The overall socioeconomic situation of Muslims continues to be characterised by substantial 
disadvantages and poor access to resources and human capital compared to the total 
population. These disparities and inclusion barriers are caused by a complex interplay of 
various factors (Hassan 2010: 583; University of Newcastle 2011: 32-46), ranging from 
racially and/or religiously motivated forms of discrimination  especially in the access to the 
labour market (Booth et al. 2012), the poor recognition of overseas qualifications (Colic-
Peisker and Tilbury 2006) to community factors (e.g. family patterns and gender roles, 
settlement-related adjustment issues) or demography (e.g. younger age profile, more families 
with young children). More targeted research is needed to gain deeper insights into these 
interwoven factors. What this data analysis clearly shows, however, is that despite the 
prevalence of these disparities some Muslims have been catching up. This development is 
reflected most vividly in the data on education attainments. A growing number and 
proportion of Muslims hold a university degree – almost 25 per cent in 2011 which is higher 
than the total national average.  There is also a growing trend for educated Muslims to 
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occupy more prestigious and better paid positions, for example, as managers or professionals. 
These developments point to the growing emergence of a professionally well-established, 
highly educated Muslim elite. But this is only half the story. The majority of Muslims still 
have no post-secondary education attainment at all. Similarly, the average employment 
experience for Muslims, in particular the high unemployment rate, demonstrates a continuous 
socioeconomic disadvantage.  
The last three Census data suggests that the Muslim experience of socioeconomic 
marginalisation is not simply related to the challenges of recent immigration. While new 
Muslim migrants face obvious difficulties, not dissimilar to other new settlers, problems of 
socioeconomic disadvantage is much more pervasive. Australian-born Muslims appear to be 
equally affected by such marginalisation. The consequent sense of disappointment with their 
unfulfilled expectations holds a potential for far-reaching repercussions for a sense of 
citizenship and belonging 
Discussion: implications for Muslim active citizenship 
Bearing in mind the Civic Voluntarism Model, given their low socioeconomic status, 
Muslims in Australia often lack access to relevant resources that facilitate civic and political 
participation and are hence less likely to get involved in formal forms of civic engagement. 
The 2011 census data on Muslim volunteering rates seem to confirm the above: Less than one 
in ten Muslim respondents (9.18 per cent) stated they volunteer for an organisation or group, 
compared to almost double this proportion among the total population (17.8 per cent) (ABS 
2011). However, this ‘statistical fact’ needs to be interpreted with analytical caution due to 
the census question’s skewed bias towards formal volunteering, which may not be a very 
suitable tool to accurately capture Muslims’ civic engagement. Madkhul asserts that ethnic 
minority members may ‘prefer a more informal and less bureaucratic approach to 
volunteering’ (Madkhul 2007: 8).  
Based on the qualitative research we argue that the Civic Voluntarism Model retains 
important relevance to Muslims in Australia. Economic hardship is a barrier to civic and 
political activism.3 This is not to say that only economically well established and highly 
educated Muslims become active citizens. Clearly, the process of active citizenship is 
complex and multi-faceted and cannot be described as a direct reflection of one’s resources. 
However, as Hassan convincingly argues, ‘[e]conomic disadvantage is disempowering’ 
(2010: 582). It hampers not only the ability and eagerness to participate effectively (see 
Verba et al. 1995), but also ‘increases the probability of ... alienation from mainstream 
Australian society’ (Hassan 2010: 582).  
In addition, other cleavages have been emerging that complicate the picture. On the one hand, 
there is an increasing proportion of Muslims who actively engage with Australian mainstream 
society, who feel Australian and have no problems reconciling their religious with their civic 
identity. This is what can be described as the new Muslim civic elite. Many are economically 
well-established, educated and articulate, eager to participate in and contribute to society at 
large, be it individually or through engagement in Muslim community or mainstream 
organisations (Amath 2013; Roose 2013). Hass Dellal, executive director of the Australian 
                                                          
3
 In a 2007 survey respondents from cultural minority communities explained their concerns about volunteering, 
highlighting problems of, among others, personal time constraints and additional volunteering-related costs, for 
example, for public transport or meals (AMF and VA 2007: 66) 
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Multicultural Foundation, for example, stated during an interview in September 2013 that he 
has encountered ‘a great proportion of young Australian Muslims who are really getting out 
there and participate and have become quite successful in media, political parties, local 
councils, and a whole range of other activities’. Sheikh Shady Al Sulemain, the youngest 
Australian-born Imam and National Secretary of the Australian National Imams Council 
states optimistically in early 2013: 
I believe that the Australian Muslim community is going through a positive direction, 
give it ten years and you’re gonna find big changes in this community okay, more 
educated Muslims, more political involvement for Muslims, less Muslims on the 
streets, less Muslims on drugs, less Muslims in prisons.  
Qualitative research suggests that a small segment within Muslim communities shows no 
desire to be part of Australian society; some reject the democratic foundation of the 
Australian polity as illegitimate. A small minority refuses to participate in general elections 
because they do not accept the general legitimacy of the Australian political system. (Al-
Momani et al. 2010: 16). While the view that Muslim and Australian identities are compatible 
is generally shared among Muslims, a small but vocal minority remains defiant. A 2009 
report produced by the Monash University Centre for Muslim Minorities and Islam Policy 
Studies found that 4.3 per cent of Muslim respondents (in a sample of 282) disagreed strongly 
with the statement ‘I can be a good Muslim and a good Australian’ (2009: 18).  
Muslim communities have been traditionally inward looking and preoccupied with the 
internal concerns of the community. But the shocks of terrorist attacks have made them aware 
of the importance of reaching out to the wider community and becoming more active in the 
public domain. While the extent of their civic and political participation cannot be 
quantitatively determined, there is a general consensus that Australian Muslims have become 
much more engaged in various forms of civic and political activities in the post-9/11 decade 
(Peucker and Akbarzadeh 2014). Amath (2013) identifies three main areas of Muslim 
community engagement, which pulled an unprecedented number of Muslims into the sphere 
of active citizenship: inter-faith initiatives (Bouma et al. 2007, 61), media engagement 
(Dreher 2010) and government consultations. The past decade has fundamentally changed the 
way in which Muslim community organisations negotiate their civic standing and engaged 
with the wider society, be it their immediate neighbourhood, other civil society and/or faith 
groups, local, state or federal government and the media (Peucker and Akbarzadeh 2014). 
With the accumulation of human and social capital, lines of communications with political 
decision-makers, public opinion leaders and other influential stakeholders have been 
established and enhanced – and often successfully utilised for Muslim political and civic 
participation. However, as several community leaders have lamented, this multiple 
engagement with the wider society has also taken up a lot of their resources and has 
distracted them from equally important community-internal tasks.  
This new way of civic negotiation has been executed effectively by a growing number of 
Muslims, equipped with the civic skills and personal commitment to do so, often as 
representatives of community organisations, such as the Islamic Council of Victoria (ICV), 
the Affinity Foundation or various Muslim women’s organisations, to name a few. It is 
illustrative to consider the make-up of the ICV board as an indicative example. The 2014 
President is Nadeem Hussain, an environmental Protection Officer of Pakistani background 
with a Master’s degree from the Asian Institute of Technology in Bangkok. Vice President 
Maryum Chaudhry, a 2013 Victorian Women’s Governance Scholarship award winner from 
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the Australian Institute of Company Directors, is a graduate of the University of Sydney. 
Other board members include an accountant, PhD student, psychologist, a university centre 
coordinator and the head of Human Resources at Australia Post. 
But many of these agents of Muslim active citizenship who took on the post-9/11 challenges 
of the Muslim communities encountered opposition from an unexpected direction – from 
within their own communities. Especially those Muslim individuals and organisations who 
became involved in collaborations and consultations with the government or simply accepted 
government funding for projects on promoting social cohesion have been viewed by some 
segments of the Muslim communities with suspicion (Akbarzadeh 2013). An executive AFIC 
board member asserted that those Muslim organisations that were engaging with the 
government were ‘seen by some Muslims on the grassroots level as the government’s 
puppets’. Nora Amath found in interviews with key representatives of Muslim civil society 
organisations that even those involved in interfaith dialogue have become the target of 
internal criticism and that ‘this mistrust seemed to be aimed specifically at Muslim women’s 
organisations’ (2013: 123). Internal dynamics and mistrust have reinforced the schism 
between those engaged and politically active Muslim citizens and ‘this minority within the 
Muslim community that have always been more marginalized, because they look a certain 
way, have language barriers, and other things’, according to an AFIC board member.   
It remains an open question as to whether Muslim organisations are sufficiently established 
and resourced to retain credibility within their own communities – without jeopardising their 
positive relations and lines of communication with mainstream society. They have to find 
new approaches to tackle the problems of community fragmentation and marginalisation on 
their own terms and with their own arguments – and not as an executor of the government’s 
will.  
Nevertheless, the government has an important role to play. Living up to its own 
multicultural promises, it needs to make greater efforts to promote equal access to 
educational and socioeconomic resources and ensure substantive equality beyond the 
formality of political rights. This requires targeted measures and investment in settlement 
services, as well as a revived commitment to empowering migrant and ethnic/religious 
communities.   
Conclusion    
The last Australian Census data show that Australian Muslims continue to be overrepresented 
in lower socioeconomic strata. Muslims perform below the national average in almost all key 
indicators: income level, type of profession, unemployment rates and home ownership. A 
comparison with 2001 and 2006 Census data suggest that this is a persistent pattern. The only 
area where Muslims have a marked advantage over the national average is in the area of 
tertiary education. Australian Muslims are more likely to hold a university degree than the 
national average rates. 
Muslims in Australia constitute a particularly disadvantaged minority group – not only in 
comparison to the total population but also to any other religious group. For example, the 
2011 Census data analysis reveals that no other religious minority in Australia is affected 
more by unemployment and no other group has a lower level of personal income than 
Muslims (ABS 2011). Similar disparities can be found when comparing first-generation 
Muslim immigrants to other non-Muslim immigrant groups. The Australian experience is not 
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unique in Western societies and resembles in many ways the situation of Muslims in many 
Western European countries (Peucker and Akbarzadeh 2014, 28-45, Open Society Institute 
2010, 109-113).The persistent pattern of Muslim underperformance on key socioeconomic 
indicators holds significant implications for the sense of belonging and citizenship. The most 
immediate consequence of socioeconomic marginalisation is limited access to the resources 
that facilitate civic and political engagement. As Verba et al. (1995) have argued, time, 
money and civic skills greatly enhance one’s capacity to engage with and contribute to 
society, which fosters emotional connections with the polity. Applying this resource-based 
model to Australian Muslims demonstrates  significant gaps in the infrastructure which could 
undermine identification with Australia and active citizenship. High unemployment rates, low 
income and a persistent sense of being on the margins of society dent the natural instinct for 
Muslims to aspire for full citizenship. Continued disparity in wealth and prospects of 
prosperity, evident in the 2001, 2006 and 2011 Census, work against the sense of belonging.  
Despite these obvious challenges, however, an increasingly assertive Muslim civic elite has 
emerged to address the limitations and barriers facing Muslims in Australia, with a view to 
claiming full active citizenship. This class of often well-educated elite has benefitted from the 
equal treatment-based political framework of Australian multiculturalism to claim a voice 
and advance the cause of Muslims in this country. The achievements of the Muslim civic elite 
in raising issues of concern in the public domain and lobbying the government have been 
significant. There are now many channels of communication between Muslim organisations 
and government agencies. But the impressive record of claiming a voice and becoming 
proactive citizens pales in significance when compared to continued socioeconomic 
marginalisation and disadvantage. 
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